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DOHSA'S COMMERCIAL AVIATION EXCEPTION: HOW
MASS AIRLINE DISASTERS INFLUENCED CONGRESS





E IGHTEEN YEARS BEFORE 9/11, there was 9/1-a ColdWar event so tragic and catastrophic that, like the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by Arab fanatics in
the new millennium, it seared itself into the consciousness of
three nations.' On August 31, 1983, a Boeing 747 aircraft, oper-
ated by Korean Air Lines (KAL) and carrying 269 passengers,
departed New York City at approximately 11:50 p.m.2 After a
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I Both South Korea and Japan have national memorials for the victims of Ko-
rean Air Flight 007, and for many years in the United States, the event was memo-
rialized annually by the families of the American passengers who perished in the
attack.
2 REPORT OF THE COMPLETION OF THE FACT FINDING INVESTIGATION REGARDING
THE SHOOTING DOWN OF KOREAN AIR LINES BOEING 747 (FLIGHT KE007) ON Au-
GUST 31, 1983 4-6 (1993) [hereinafter ICAO FLIGHT 007 REPORT). See In re Ko-
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fuel stop in Anchorage, Alaska, the flight would proceed to its
final destination, Seoul, Korea, where it would land on Septem-
ber 1, 1983.1 The pilots, however, inadvertently failed to pro-
gram the aircraft's inertial navigation system properly.' Flying
in the dark over the North Pacific at 35,000 feet, the aircraft
slowly drifted off course, until it entered Soviet airspace near
Sakhalin Island.5 With the belief that a spy plane was approach-
ing, the Soviet air force scrambled three fighterjets to intercept
the wayward aircraft.' Within minutes, and without warning, the
Soviet jets fired heat-seeking missiles at the aircraft.' The ex-
ploding missiles damaged the aircraft's hydraulic systems, and
shrapnel penetrated the cabin, causing a rapid decompression.,
The crippled aircraft entered a long, spiraling descent before it
slammed into the Sea ofJapan and was destroyed.9 All 269 pas-
sengers and crew on board the aircraft perished, including 105
Koreans, 28 Japanese, and 62 Americans.10
Although it was impossible to foresee at the time, the KAL
Flight 007 disaster would permanently change the body of juris-
prudence under the federal maritime wrongful death statute,
The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)." Not only did the
disaster have a significant impact on Cold War relations between
the United States and the Soviet Union,1 2 it spawned two deci-
rean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Wyler v. Korean Air Lines Co., 928 F.2d 1167, 1169-70 (D.C. 1991).
3 ICAO FLIGHT 007 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
4 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 932 F.2d at 1476-1477. ICAO FLIGHT 007 RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 59. In 1983, the Global Positioning System was used solely
by the military. As a result of the attack on Flight 007, President Ronald Reagan
issued an order making GPS available for civilian use. See Wikipedia, Korean Air
Lines Flight 007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KoreanAirLines-Flight_007
(last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
5 ICAO FLIGHT 007 REPORT, supra note 2, at 59.
6 See Michael R. Gordon, Ex-Soviet Pilot Still Insists KAL 007 Was Spying, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/09/
world/ex-soviet-pilot-still-insists-kal-007-was-spying.html?pagewanted=all; ICAO
FLIGHT 007 REPORT, supra note 2, at 51.
7 ICAO FLIGHT 007 REPORT, supra note 2, at 33, 35.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1476 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
11 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2006) (formerly codified at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 761-768 (1926)).
12 President Ronald Reagan condemned the shootdown as the "Korean airline
massacre," a "crime against humanity [that] must never be forgotten" and an "act
of barbarism" and "inhuman brutality." President Ronald Reagan, Address to the
Nation on the Soviet Attack on a Korean Civilian Airliner (Sept. 5, 1983), availa-
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sions by the U.S. Supreme Court that swept away recovery of
non-pecuniary damages in DOHSA cases." Those decisions
were handed down in the mid-1990s against the backdrop of an-
other noteworthy mass airline disaster: TWA Flight 800." In re-
sponse to an outpouring of sympathy for the families of the
victims of TWA Flight 800, Congress took up the question of
compensation for non-pecuniary damages in cases governed by
DOHSA.15 The result was an amendment to DOHSA known as
the "Commercial Aviation Exception," which allows recovery of
ble at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/90583a.htm. The
incident disrupted a high-level summit in Madrid between Secretary of State
George Schultz and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and the Soviet
Union was forced to use its veto to block a United Nations resolution condemn-
ing it for shooting down the aircraft. Wikipedia, Korean Air Lines Flight 007, supra
note 4. State legislatures in New York and New Jersey voted to deny landing
rights to any Soviet aircraft in violation of international law. Id.
13 Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116 (1998); Zicherman v. Korean
Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996). Both of these cases were skillfully argued
before the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of KAL by AndrewJ. Harakas. Dooley,
524 U.S. at 117; Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 217. Mr. Harakas is presently a partner in
the New York office of Clyde & Co. A third decision by the Supreme Court aris-
ing from the KAL Flight 007 disaster involved the effect of the ten-point ticket
type requirement contained in the inter-carrier agreement known as the Mon-
treal Agreement. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 123 (1989).
14 See generally NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
REPORT: IN-FLIGHT BREAKUP OVER THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES
FLIGHT 800, BOEING 747-131, N93119, NEAR EAST MORICHES, N.Y., JULY 17, 1996
(2000) [hereinafter NTSB FLIGHT 800 REPORT], available at http://www.ntsb.gov/
Publictn/2000/AAR0003.pdf.
15 Three other major air disasters helped to bring issues of wrongful death
compensation and assistance to families to the forefront in Congress in the
1990's: (1) Valujet Flight 592, which crashed in the Florida Everglades on May 11,
1996, in which 105 passengers were killed, see NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
BOARD, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT, IN-FLIGHT FIRE AND IMPACT WITH TERRAIN,
VALUJET AIRLINES FLIGHT 592, DC-9-32, N904VJ, EVERGLADES, NEAR MIAMI, FLOR-
IDA, MAY 11, 1996 x (1997), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/1997/
AAR9706.pdf; (2) Swissair Flight 111, which crashed near Peggy's Cove, Nova
Scotia on September 2, 1998, in which 215 passengers were killed, see TRANSPOR-
TATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA, AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT, IN-FLIGHT
FIRE LEADING TO COLLISION WITH WATER, SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111, A98H0003, availa-
ble at http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1998/a98h0003/
a98h0003.asp; and (3) Egyptair Flight 990, which crashed near Nantucket Island
on October 31, 1999, in which 203 passengers were killed, see NATIONAL TRANS-
PORTATION SAFETY BOARD, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BRIEF, EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990, BOE-
ING 767-366ER, SU-GAP, 60 MILEs SOUTH OF NANTUCKET, MASSACHUSETTS,
OCTOBER 31, 1999 1-4 (2002), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/
AABO201.pdf. See H.R. REP. No. 105-201, at 1-2, 4 (1997); H.R. REP. No. 106-32,
at 1-4 (1999); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Peggy's Cove, 210 F. Supp. 2d 570,
583, n.12 (2002).
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loss of society damages in actions arising from a "commercial
aviation accident." 6
The purpose of this article is to show how mass airline disas-
ters, beginning with the Soviet shootdown of KAL Flight 007,
constituted the major influence on Congress in its enactment of
the Commercial Aviation Exception, and that the Commercial
Aviation Exception was never intended to apply to general avia-
tion cases. The article will provide a brief history of DOHSA,
and an analysis of how attempts to circumvent DOHSA's limita-
tions on recoverable damages in the KAL Flight 007 litigation
led to two landmark U.S. Supreme Court rulings on non-pecuni-
ary damages.1 7 The article will next describe how the explosion
of TWA Flight 800 over the waters near Long Island motivated
Congress to create a limited exception to the rule against non-
pecuniary damages in DOHSA. Finally, the article will address
the only two federal district court cases that have, to date, inter-
preted the Commercial Aviation Exception in the context of
general aviation accidents." The article concludes that the only
reasonable construction of the Commercial Aviation Exception
is that it has no application in wrongful death actions arising
from general aviation accidents, but, to the contrary, applies
solely to actions arising from commercial airline accidents on
the high seas.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DOHSA
Like the Commercial Aviation Exception, DOHSA itself was a
legislative response by Congress to a tragic accident on the high
seas.19 On May 16, 1877, the steamer Harrisburg was cruising in
the waters of the Nantucket Sound between Massachusetts and
the islands of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket, when it col-
lided with the schooner Marietta Tilton.2 0 As a result of the colli-
sion, the first officer of the Maietta Tilton, Silas T. Rickards,
drowned at sea.21 At the time of the accident, the Harrisburg was
16 46 U.S.C. § 30307 (2006).
17 Dooley, 524 U.S. 116; Zicherman, 516 U.S. 217.
18 Eberli v. Cirrus Design Corp., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Brown
v. Eurocopters S.A., 111 F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
19 See generally, Robert Hughes, Death Actions in Admiralty, 31 YALE L.J. 115
(1921).
20 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 199 (1886).
21 Id. at 199-201.
[ 75140
2010] DOHSA'S COMMERCIAL AVIATION EXCEPTION
engaged in the domestic coasting trade, and was owned by the
Port of Philadelphia.2 2
Rickards's widow filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on February 25, 1882, nearly
five years after the accident. 23 Both Pennsylvania law and Massa-
chusetts law allowed an action for wrongful death, but the stat-
ute of limitations under each law was one year.2 4 The district
court found that the action sounded in admiralty law, that gen-
eral maritime law applied, that the one year statute of limita-
tions did not bar the action, and that the Harrisburg was
negligent: "The drowning complained of was caused by the im-
proper navigation, negligence, and fault of the said steamer,
producing the collision aforesaid, and the libellants are entitled
to recover."2 5 Accordingly, the district court issued a judgment
against the Harrisburg in the amount of $5,100.26
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the judgment was re-
versed.2 1 In an opinion by Chief Justice Morrison Waite, the
Court held that under both the common law28 and admiralty law
"no civil action lies for an injury which results in death."2 Chief
Justice Waite canvassed not only U.S. law, but also the law of
foreign nations on this issue:
[W]e know of no country that has adopted a different rule on
this subject for the sea[s] from that which it maintains on the
land; and the maritime law, as accepted and received by mari-
time nations generally, leave the matter untouched. It is not
mentioned in the laws of Oleron, of Wisbuy, or of the Hanse
Towns, (1 Pet. Adm. Dec. Appx.;) nor in the Marine Ordinance
of Louis XIV., (2 Pet. Adm. Dec. Appx.;) and the understanding
of the leading text writers in this country has been that no such
action will lie in the absence of a statute giving a remedy at law
for the wrong. Ben. Adm. (2d Ed.) § 309; 2 Pars. Shipp. & Adm.
350; Henry, Adm. Jur. 74.so
22 Id. at 199.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 200.
25 Id. at 204.
26 Id. at 200. This would be approximately $102,000 today.
27 Harnsburg, 119 U.S. at 214.
28 For this proposition, the Harnisburg court relied on its own decision in Insur-
ance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877). See Harrnsburg, 119 U.S. at 204, 213-14.
29 Harnsburg, 119 U.S. at 204-05. This rule was premised on the notion that
since a right of action was personal to the victim, the right expired when the
victim died. Id. at 213.
- Id. at 213.
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On this basis, the Harrisburg court concluded that no wrongful
death action "will lie in the courts of the United States under
the general maritime law,"3 1 and the judgment was reversed.12
In the years after The Harrisburg was decided, several attempts
were made by the Maritime Law Association to draft and submit
to Congress proposed legislation for a maritime death remedy."
During this time, it appears that many maritime law experts
were hostile to the holding of The Harrisburg.4 One court noted
that " [c] ritics of The Harrisburg maintained that the rule of that
case had been rejected by '[e]very country of western Europe,'
and was a 'disgrace to a civilized people.'" 3  Although the early
efforts to pass a maritime death statute were unsuccessful, re-
newed efforts started to gain traction in the aftermath of the
Titanic disaster on April 14-15, 1912, in which 1,517 passengers
and crew perished. 6 Ultimately, in 1920, Congress passed the
DOHSA legislation, which created an exclusively federal wrong-
ful death action and a comprehensive statutory scheme for com-
pensation in actions arising from deaths on the high seas. The
statute was patterned after Lord Campbell's Act,3 and it created
31 Id.
32 Id. at 214. The Harrisburg court went on to ask the question whether the
lawsuit could be maintained under the laws of Pennsylvania or Massachusetts, but
did not reach an answer. "About this we express no opinion, as we are entirely
satisfied that this suit was begun too late." Id. at 214.
3 Hughes, supra note 19, at 116-17. See also, In re Air Crash Off Long Island,
N.Y. on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2000) and In re Air Crash Disas-
ter Near Peggy's Cove, N.S. on Sept. 2, 1998, 210 F. Supp. 2d 570, 576-78 (E.D.
Pa. 2002).
3 Long Island, 209 F.3d at 204.
3 Id.
36 Hughes, supra note 19, at 117; Long Island, 209 F.3d at 204; Wikipedia, RMS
Titanic, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Titanic (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
3 As one court put it,
[o] riginally, the admiralty, as did the common law Courts, denied a
right of action for damages for death on the high seas. However, in
1920, Congress passed the DOHSA permitting the personal repre-
sentatives of a decedent to institute an action for wrongful death on
the high seas. Since Libellants had nothing before Section One of the
DOHSA was passed, Section One gives them all they now have.
Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929, 931 (D. Del. 1962) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
38 See Calvert Magruder & Marshall Grout, Wrongful Death Within The Admiralty
jurisdiction, 35 YALE L. J. 395, 402 (1926) (quoting Lord Campbell's Act (1846) 9
& 10 Vict. c. 93). At the time of Lord Campbell's Act, the common law was in
transition from notions of "trespass" to the concept of "negligence." W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 30 (5th ed. 1984). Certainly prod-
uct liability theories, such as strict liability, would not emerge for another 100
2010] DOHSA'S COMMERCIAL AVIATION EXCEPTION 143
a maritime negligence action for deaths on the high seas
"caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default."39
The DOHSA legislation enacted by Congress in 1920 pro-
vided, inter alia, that: (1) a cause of action exists for the death of
a person caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default, occur-
ring on the high seas;40 (2) the action may be maintained by
the personal representative of the decedent's estate for the ex-
clusive benefit of the decedent's beneficiaries; 41 (3) in situations
where the plaintiff is injured, but dies prior to the completion of
his lawsuit, the personal representative of the estate may be sub-
stituted in and the action may proceed as a DOHSA action;42 (4)
a two year statute of limitations period;" (5) provisions gov-
erning foreign causes of action;44 and (6) a bar to contributory
negligence as a complete defense.4 5 In its original formulation,
years. Id. at 694, (discussing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897
(1963) (stating "[t]he first case to apply a tort theory of strict liability generally
was Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. in California in 1963")). By 1920, the
year DOHSA was enacted, the only cause of action available for recovery of dam-
ages arising from a defective product was a common law action for negligence.
Id. at 682-84 (discussing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)).
Accordingly, it follows that when Congress created DOHSA, it created what was
then available under the common law-a cause of action for negligence. See, e.g.,
Magruder & Grout, supra note 38, at 423 (stating "it is apparent that the 'wrong-
ful act, neglect or default' referred to in Section 1 of the Federal Act must some-
times be taken to apply to the initial act of negligence and sometimes to its result in
bringing the fatal force in contact with the victim.") (emphasis added).
39 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1926), recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. § 765, recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 30305.
4 Id. § 763, repealed by Pub. L. 96-382, § 2, 94 Stat. 1525 (1980). The two year
statute of limitations contained in Section 763 was repealed by Congress on Octo-
ber 6, 1980, at which time a three year statute of limitations went into effect, 46
U.S.C. § 763a, recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 30106. See Friel v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 751
F.2d 1037, 1038 (9th Cir. 1985); Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d 893, 897, n.5
(9th Cir. 1983).
44 46 U.S.C. § 764, recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 30306.
45 Id. § 766, recodified as 46 U.S.C. § 30304. One court has observed that that
"the word 'negligence' appears repeatedly throughout the Committee Reports
without mention of theories other than negligence." Noel v. United Aircraft
Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929, 933 (1962). Moreover, in Section 766 of DOHSA, Con-
gress specifically provided that "contributory negligence of the decedent is not a bar
to recovery. The court shall consider the degree of negligence of the decedent and
reduce the recovery accordingly." 46 U.S.C. § 30304 (emphasis added). It is
clear, therefore, from the legislative history of DOHSA, and the terms Congress
chose to create the DOHSA cause of action, that it was creating a maritime negli-
gence cause of action. Those courts which have concluded that DOHSA allows a
theory of liability based on strict liability and breach of warranty are simply
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DOHSA limited damages to "fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the
suit is brought," 6 and punitive damages were-and still are-
expressly prohibited. 7 In its deliberations, Congress expressly
rejected trial by jury for a DOHSA cause of action, and accord-
ingly all cases governed by DOHSA must be tried to the court
sitting without a jury.4 8
As will be seen below, even though the original intent of Con-
gress in enacting DOHSA was to limit recovery to pecuniary
damages, attempts to circumvent this limitation in the litigation
arising from the KAL Flight 007 shootdown led to two landmark
Supreme Court rulings on non-pecuniary damages, Zicherman
and Dooley.49
III. ZICHERMAN AND DOOLEY
In the aftermath of the Flight 007 attack, numerous wrongful
death lawsuits were filed across the United States against KAL,
Boeing, Litton, Jeppesen, and the United States.5 0 The cases,
which ultimately grew from 42 filed initially to 190, were consoli-
dated in multi-district proceedings in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia.5 1 In a series of pre-trial rulings, the
district court dismissed plaintiffs' actions against Boeing and Lit-
wrong, and have impermissibly altered the statutory scheme established by Con-
gress. See, e.g., Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys., Co., 125 F.3d 1371, 1379-86
(11th Cir. 1997); Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th
Cir. 1984); Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 636 (8th
Cir. 1972); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Const. & Design Co., 565 F.2d
1129, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1977); Best v. Honeywell, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 269, 271 (D.
Conn. 1980); Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119, 124-27 (D. La.
1969).
46 46 U.S.C. § 762, recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 30303.
4 Id. at § 762(b)(1), recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 30307(b).
48 Romero v. Int'l Terminal Op. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371 n.28 (1959); Tallentire
v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 800 F.2d 1390, 1391 (5th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 477 U.S. 207 (1986). But see text accompanying footnote 36 infra.
4 Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116 (1998); Zicherman v. Korean
Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996). See generally Oldahm v. Korean Air Lines Co.,
127 F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir.
1996); Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 84 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Saavedra v.
Korean Air Lines Co., 93 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1996); Kole v. Korean Air Lines Co.,
92 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished disposition); Hollie v. Korean
Air Lines Co., Ltd., 60 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1995); Alcabasa v. Korean Air Lines Co.,
62 F.3d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
5o See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 575 F. Supp. 342, 343
(J.P.M.L. 1983).
51 Id. at 343-44.
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ton," Jeppesen,"5 and the United States,54 and denied KAL's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there were
material issues of fact that required a trial. The parties agreed
to a bifurcated proceeding in which liability was tried first, and
plaintiffs' case against KAL went to trial before ajury in the Dis-
trict of Columbia on the issue whether KAL had committed
"willful misconduct" within the meaning of Article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention.56 On August 2, 1989, the jury rendered a
verdict in plaintiffs' favor on the issue of liability, finding that
the destruction of KAL Flight 007 was proximately caused by the
willful misconduct of the flight crew in allowing the aircraft to
stray over Soviet airspace. The jury also awarded $50 million
dollars in punitive damages against KAL." On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that there was sufficient evidence
to uphold the jury's verdict on willful misconduct, but reversed
the award of punitive damages.5 ' A petition for certiorari to the
52 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, Misc. No. 83-0345 1985 WL
9447, at *8 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1985).
53 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 597 F. Supp. 619, 621
(D.D.C. 1984).
54 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 646 F. Supp. 30, 36 (D.D.C.
1986).
55 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 704 F. Supp. 1135, 1158
(D.D.C. 1988). The Court also denied KAL's motion to strike plaintiff's jury de-
mand, on the grounds that jury trials are available in Warsaw Convention cases.
Id. at 1151-58. As discussed infra at notes 69-72 and accompanying text, this
ruling was probably error under the Supreme Court's analysis in Zicherman.
56 Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 118 (1998). The formal title
of the treaty known as the "Warsaw Convention" is the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12,
1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), note following 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2006)
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. Under Warsaw Convention Article 25, as sup-
plemented by the inter-carrier agreement known as the Montreal Agreement,
Agreement CAB 18900, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), KAL's liability was limited to
the sum of $75,000, unless plaintiffs could prove that KAL committed "willful
misconduct" within the meaning of Article 25.
57 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1476
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1475, 1479-1481, 1484-1490. Even though Russian divers had recov-
ered Flight 007's flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder almost immedi-
ately after the crash, both of these were withheld from the official ICAO
investigation into the cause of the tragedy. Wikipedia, Korean Air Lines Flight 007,
supra note 4. Accordingly, these crucial pieces of evidence were never admitted
into evidence at the liability trial. Subsequently, after the break-up of the Soviet
Union, the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, delivered the Flight
007 cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder to the President of South
Korea as a peace offering in October 1992. Id. These devices were analyzed by
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Supreme Court was denied 6 and the individual cases were re-
manded by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to the
original transferor courts for trial on damages.
One of the cases that proceeded to a damages trial involved
passenger Muriel Kole.6 2 Ms. Kole's mother, Marjorie
Zicherman, and her sister, Muriel Mahalek, filed their wrongful
death action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York.6 1 Plaintiffs argued that, under the Warsaw Con-
vention, KAL was liable for "damage sustained,"6 4 that accord-
ingly all damages were recoverable, including loss of society,
mental anguish and grief, and the decedent's pre-death pain
and suffering.6" The district court agreed, and allowed plaintiffs
to introduce evidence of non-pecuniary damages at trial.66 The
jury returned a verdict for the decedent's sister in the amount of
$251,000, and for decedent's mother in the amount of
$124,000.67 Included in these verdicts were compensation for
loss of society in the amount of $70,000 to decedent's sister and
$28,000 for decedent's mother. 8
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.6 9  The
Zicherman court conducted a lengthy analysis of the meaning of
Article 17, and held that Article 17 merely established carrier
liability under the Warsaw Convention, but left the question of
compensable damages to the applicable domestic law of the
treaty's contracting States.o Under a traditional choice of law
analysis, the applicable law in Zicherman would be the law of the
United States, and there was "little doubt" that the U.S. law gov-
the ICAO investigators and a report entitled "Report on the Completion of the
ICAO Fact-Finding Investigation" was released in June 1993. In re Korean Air
Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 156 F.R.D. 18, 20 (D.D.C. 1994). KAL's subse-
quent Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the liability judgment based on the
ICAO's June 1993 report was denied by the district court. Id. at 20, 23.
6o Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
61 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 156 F.R.D. at 20.
62 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 43 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1994).
63 Id.
64 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he
carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding
of a passenger. . . ." Warsaw Convention, supra note 56, art. 17 (emphasis added).
65 Zicherman, 43 F.3d at 20.
- Id. at 20-21.
67 Id. at 20.
6 Id. at 21.
6 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 231 (1996).
70 Id. at 223-27.
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erning deaths on the high seas was DOHSA.7 1 The Court had
no difficulty concluding that since DOHSA limited recovery to
pecuniary damages, plaintiff was precluded from recovering loss
of society damages."
After the Supreme Court handed down Zicherman, KAL filed a
motion to dismiss all claims for non-pecuniary damages in the
multidistrict litigation.73 Having been foreclosed from recovery
of loss of society damages under Warsaw Convention Article 17,
plaintiffs resorted to two alternative theories in opposing KAL's
motion. 7 4 First, plaintiffs argued that they should be able to re-
cover survivor's mental anguish and grief under Korean law7 5
pursuant to § 764 of DOHSA, which provides that "[w] henever a
right of action is granted by the law of any foreign State on ac-
count of death by wrongful act, neglect or default, occurring
upon the high seas, such right may be maintained in an appro-
priate action in admiralty in the courts of the United States."7 6
First, Plaintiffs argued that the remedies contained in §§ 761
and 764 were cumulative, and that plaintiffs "are entitled to re-
cover all pecuniary damages allowed by virtue of [§ 761] and in
addition any damages allowed by Korean law pursuant to
[§ 764]." Second, plaintiffs argued that they should be al-
lowed to supplement a DOHSA cause of action with a general
maritime survival action for pre-death pain and suffering.78
Plaintiffs contended that "their survival claims are distinct from
wrongful death claims and are available under general maritime
law." 79
The district court rejected both of these arguments.80 The
court observed that under its choice of law analysis, U.S. law gov-
erned damages issues in the litigation and that accordingly,
plaintiffs' argument that mental anguish and grief damages
were available under Korean law was "irrelevant."8 1 Similarly,
the district court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the remedies
71 Id. at 225-26, 229-30.
72 Id. at 230-31.




76 46 U.S.C. § 764 (1926).
77 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 935 F. Supp. at 14 n.2.
78 Id. at 15.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 14-15.
81 Id. at 14 n.2.
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in §§ 761 and 764 were "cumulative." "The court finds that[§ 761] and [§ 764] are mutually exclusive rather than cumula-
tive."82 Finally, the district court concluded that a survival cause
of action for pre-death pain and suffering under general mari-
time law was not permitted because "it appears to this Court that
with Zicherman, the Supreme Court has held that DOHSA pro-
vides the exclusive remedy for damages which cannot be supple-
mented with general maritime principles."8 ' The district court
certified its ruling for an interlocutory appeal by plaintiffs, and
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the dis-
trict court's ruling in Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, Co.84
Plaintiffs successfully petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme
Court, where they contended that "because DOHSA is a wrong-
ful-death statute-giving surviving relatives a cause of action for
losses they suffered as a result of the decedent's death-it has no
bearing on the availability of a survival action."8 The Dooley
court soundly rejected this contention:
We disagree. DOHSA expresses Congress' judgment that there
should be no such cause of action in cases of death on the high
seas. By authorizing only certain surviving relatives to recover
damages, and by limiting damages to the pecuniary losses sus-
tained by those relatives, Congress provided the exclusive recov-
ery for deaths that occur on the high seas."
Taken together, Zicherman and Dooley eliminated recovery of
any non-pecuniary damages in cases governed by DOHSA. This
set the stage for a death compensation dilemma confronting
Congress in the aftermath of the TWA Flight 800 catastrophe.
IV. TWA FLIGHT 800, THE ZICHERMAN DILEMMA, AND
THE COMMERCIAL AVIATION SOLUTION
On July 17,.1996, at approximately 8:30 p.m., a Boeing 747-
131 aircraft, operated by Trans World Airlines as TWA Flight
800, departed from John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City
for Rome, Italy, with a planned intermediate stop in Paris,
France." As the aircraft climbed up over the ocean near Long
82 Id.
8 Id. at 15.
84 117 F.3d 1477, 1478, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
85 Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 121-23 (1998).
86 Id. at 123.
8 NTSB FLIGHT 800 REPORT, supra note 14, at 1. See Lahr v. NTSB, 569 F.3d
964, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17,
1996, 209 F.3d 200, 201 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Island, all radio communications abruptly ceased, and the flight
data recorder stopped recording data. 8 The pilot of an
Eastwind Airlines Boeing 737 reported seeing TWA Flight 800
suddenly explode, break apart in mid-flight, and crash into the
sea.8 9 Other witnesses reported that the loud explosion was ac-
companied by a large fireball over the ocean.90 All 230 passen-
gers and crew onboard the aircraft perished.9
The spectacular destruction of TWA Flight 800 generated in-
tense public interest and speculation.9 2 One initial theory was
that the crash was caused by a terrorist missile attack.9 3 Another
theory was that TWA Flight 800 had been brought down by an
inadvertent missile strike, possibly from a Navy vessel in the
area.9 4 Still another theory was that the aircraft was destroyed by
a bomb on board the aircraft." In the days that followed the
calamity, no one knew what had caused the aircraft to blow-up.
Any one of these initial, uncorroborated theories could ulti-
mately prove to be the cause. Accordingly, in addition to the
accident investigation conducted by the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (NTSB), the crash precipitated a parallel in-
vestigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).6
The FBI interviewed more than 700 witnesses in its investiga-
tion. The wreckage was carefully analyzed by both NTSB and
FBI investigators to determine the sequence of events leading to
the catastrophe. After the longest and most extensive accident
investigation in aviation history, lasting more than four years,
the NTSB dismissed all theories that the aircraft had been at-
tacked, and concluded that the probable cause of the crash was
[a]n explosion of the center wing fuel tank (CWT), resulting
from ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in the tank.
The source of ignition energy for the explosion could not be de-
termined with certainty, but, of the sources evaluated by the in-
vestigation, the most likely was a short circuit outside of the CWT
88 NTSB FLIGHT 800 REPORT, supra note 14, at 2-3.
89 Id. at 243.
9o Id. at 231-32.
91 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 209 F.3d at 201.
92 See Wikipedia, TWA Flight 800, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TWAFlight
800 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
93 Lahr v. NTSB, 569 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 NTSB FLIGHT 800 REPORT, supra note 14, at 229-30.
97 Id. at 230.
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that allowed excessive voltage to enter it through electrical wiring
associated with the fuel quantity indication system."
The TWA Flight 800 tragedy galvanized congressional interest
in increased compensation for the families of airline accidents
on the high seas. 9 Earlier that year, on January 16, 1996, the
Supreme Court had issued its Zicherman decision, which, as dis-
cussed above, held that in a wrongful death action arising from
an international commercial aviation crash on the high seas, no
loss of society damages were recoverable.100 The problem cre-
ated by the Zicherman decision for the families of the TWA Flight
800 passengers was described by Congressman William Shuster
of Pennsylvania, who authored the House Report entitled Non-
applicability of Death on the High Seas Act to Aviation Incidents.
One issue that has arisen, affecting the families of the TWA 800
crash and also an earlier crash, involving Korean Airlines 007,
involves the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. 761 et seq.
The issue arises because the Supreme Court recently decided, in
the case of Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996), that
the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) applies to lawsuits that
arise out of an aircraft crash in the ocean more than a marine
league (about 3 miles) from land.
In the Zicherman case, the court concluded that Articles 17
and 24(2) of the Warsaw Convention governing international air
transportation, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49
Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934) (reprinted in note following 49
U.S.C. App 1502 (1988 ed.)), permit compensation only for a
legally recognized harm, but leave the determination of what
harm is legally recognizable to the applicable domestic law. The
court further concluded that when a plane crashes into the high
seas, the applicable domestic law is DOHSA. Under DOHSA,
only pecuniary losses are recognized. Therefore, the family of a
deceased passenger could recover damages for the wages that the
person would have received but not for the pain and suffering of
that person or the loss of companionship of their loved one.
The effect of this decision is to treat families differently de-
pending on whether their relative died in an aircraft that crashed
98 Id. at xvi.
- See In reAir Crash Disaster Near Peggy's Cove, 210 F. Supp. 2d 570, 583 n.12
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating "the impetus to legislate stemmed not from the TWA
Flight 800 [court] decision but from the tragedy itself, as evidenced by the fact
that Congressional resolutions on the issue of amending DOHSA were debated as
early as 1997, three years before the case was decided." (citations omitted)).
100 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 230-31 (1996).
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into the ocean or one that crashed into land. If the plane
crashes into the ocean, DOHSA applies and the family is entitled
only to pecuniary damages. However, if a plane crashes into the
land or within 3 miles of land, the applicable State tort law would
apply. These generally permit the award of non-pecuniary dam-
ages such as loss of companionship.
Given the nature and speed of air travel, it is often a matter of
happenstance as to where an aircraft crashes. The result is that a
family's rights under the law depend on pure chance. At the
Subcommittee's hearing on this issue, parents noted that where
DOHSA applied, the life of their child was made to appear prac-
tically worthless in the eyes of the law.
The Supreme Court recognized the inequity of this result and
stated that "Congress may chose to enact special provisions appli-
cable to Warsaw Convention cases, as some countries have done."
The reported bill (H.R. 2005) would do this and in such a way as
to ensure that all families would be treated the same regardless
of where a plane happened to crash.o0
In these initial hearings and discussions, Congress's approach
to the problem was to make DOHSA inapplicable to airline acci-
dents on the high seas. As Congressman Shuster explained,
[t]he reported bill amends the aviation laws in Title 49 to make
clear that DOHSA does not apply in the case of aviation acci-
dents. This change would apply to all pending cases if the court
of original jurisdiction had not yet rendered a final decision. It
would apply even if the court had rendered a decision on prelim-
inary matters in the case, including the applicability of DOHSA,
as long as the court had not rendered a final decision in the case.
This change to Title 49 would effectively prevent others similarly
situated to the family in the Zicherman case from being adversely
affected by the decision in that case. 10 2
However, this approach was ultimately rejected by Congress in
favor of the Commercial Aviation Exception.o 3 Congress feared
that if it made DOHSA inapplicable to commercial airline acci-
dents on the high seas, courts would be left with "a dizzying ar-
ray of State, Federal, foreign, or perhaps, no law about which
101 H.R. REP. No. 105-201, at 2-3 (1997); see also Peggy's Cove, 210 F. Supp. 2d at
583.
102 H.R. REP. No. 105-201, at 3.
10 See Peggy's Cove, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 584 n.13 ("The court notes that the
House Resolution for which this report was submitted, to eliminate DOHSA's
application to aviation incidents entirely, was ultimately rejected.").
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lawyers can fight endlessly, further postponing recovery."lO4
Nevertheless, it is clear from H.R. Rep. 105-201, and from a sub-
sequent House Report entitled To Clarify the Application of the Act
Popularly Known As the "Death on the High Seas Act" to Aviation Inci-
dents that Congress's focus was on the families of commercial air-
line passengers- "In the Committee's view, the reported bill will
help to ensure that families of airline accident victims will receive
fair treatment under the law."o 5 Finally, as if to leave no doubt
about its intentions, Congress made the Commercial Aviation
Exception retroactive to July 16, 1996, the day before TWA
Flight 800 exploded and crashed into the waters off Long
Island. 106
In the legislative history discussed above, there is no mention
of any concern by Congress for accidents involving purely pri-
vate, general aviation aircraft.' 7 Indeed, there was no reason
for such flights to even be on Congress's radar screen, since in
the 1996-2000 time period (as well as the present time) trans-
oceanic flights by general aviation aircraft were virtually un-
heard of, unless it was a ferry flight to deliver an aircraft on an-
other continent. Due to the technological limitations of general
aviation aircraft, general aviation pilots do not fly passengers
from New York to London on demand, because the distances
104 146 CONG. REc. S124-07 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Gorton).
105 H.R. REP. No. 105-201, at 3 (1997); H.R. REP. No. 105-201, at 2 (1999)
(emphasis added).
106 Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century,
Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.), cited in In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass. on Oct. 31, 1999,
Nos. 00-MD-1344, 01-CV-173, 01-CV-174, 01-CV-176 FB ASC, 2002 WL 32302598,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2002); Peggy's Cove, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 573-74.
107 The terms "commercial aviation" and "general aviation" appear to be so
widely understood to refer to the domestic and international airline industry that
there has never been a need to define them in any statute, as a Westlaw computer
search of the United States Code reveals. For example, in one aeronautical dic-
tionary "commercial aviation" is defined as "(i) Aircraft operated by a commer-
cial concern for profit, as distinguished from military or private aviation (ICAO).
(ii) The business and activities connected with employing commercial aircraft."
AN ILLUSTRATED DICrIONARY OF AvIATION 162 (2005). "General Aviation" is de-
fined as
[a] term used to describe the total field of aviation operation other
than the military and the airlines. General aviation includes busi-
ness flying (corporate, or executive), agricultural aviation, personal
flying for sport or pleasure, flight schools, and flying clubs. The
manufacturers of the aircraft and the maintenance facilities that
service them are also a part of general aviation.
See DICTIONARY OF AERONAUTICAL TERMs 283 (4th ed. 2006).
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are too great and because of the availability of scheduled com-
mercial airline flights on modern jet aircraft. Even for flights
undertaken for the purpose of delivering aircraft to another
continent, ferry fuel tanks must be installed to carry enough fuel
to fly over the vast distances involved in trans-oceanic aviation.
On the contrary, Congress's sole focus in enacting the Com-
mercial Aviation Exception was fair treatment for families of pas-
sengers killed in airline crashes on the high seas.' As noted by
one court,
[i]t is clear from this report [H.R. Rep. 106-32], which distin-
guishes only "land" and "close to land" from "ocean," that Con-
gress was not concerned with any problem arising from aviation
accidents occurring in foreign territorial waters. Instead, Con-
gress was intent on fashioning a uniform remedy "regardless of
where a plane happened to crash," focusing upon remedying the
disparity between DOHSA actions, which did not allow non-pecu-
niary damages, and actions under state and maritime law, which
did. 09
V. DIVERGING INTERPRETATIONS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
Surprisingly, only two reported federal court decisions have
considered the meaning of the term "commercial aviation"
since Congress enacted the Commercial Aviation Exception in
2000.10 Brown v. Eurocopter S.A., decided in 2000, was the first
108 H.R. REP. No. 105-201, at 3.
-09 Peggy's Cove, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 583-84.
110 See Brown v. Eurocopter S.A., 111 F. Supp. 2d 859, 862-63 (S.D. Tex. 2000);
see also Eberli v. Cirrus Design Corp., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1373 (S.D. Fl. 2009).
Interestingly, in Helman v. Alcoa Global Fasteners Inc., when addressing what dis-
tance from shore DOHSA becomes applicable, the district court refers to 46
U.S.C. § 30307 as the "commercial airlines amendment." Helman v. Alcoa
Global Fasteners, No. CV 09-1353 SVW, 2009 WL 2058541, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June
16, 2009). But see Rowan Co. v. Hudson Helicopters, Inc., Nos. 06-10755, 07-3350,
07-3351, 2007 WL 3046207, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2007).
While [plaintiffs] were involved in a commercial aviation accident
that occurred on the high seas [an accident involving a helicopter
transporting eight employees], neither man died as a result of the
accident. The plain language of the DOHSA amendment illus-
trates that Congress intended to allow recovery of nonpecuniary
damages only where death resulted from a commercial aviation ac-
cident. By permitting plaintiffs to recover nonpecuniary damages
as a result of being injured in a commercial aviation accident, the
Court would be sanctioning a more expansive remedy in a general
maritime claim than that remedy granted by Congress in DOHSA.
Rowan, 2007 WL 3046207, at *4.
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reported decision to address the meaning of the term "commer-
cial aviation" after the enactment of the Commercial Aviation
Exception." 1 The district court held that "commercial aviation"
means any flight by anyone in an airplane that has a trade or
commercial purpose."' Nine years later, the district court in
Eberli v. Cirrus Design Corp. specifically disagreed with the analysis
in Brown and declined to follow it."' Instead, the Eberli court
held that the "commercial aviation" exception should apply only
in cases involving the types of aviation disasters, such as the
crash of TWA flight 800, which motivated Congress to enact the
Commercial Aviation Exception.' 1 4
Brown involved the crash of a Eurocopter AS350B2 helicopter
during an emergency landing at the High Island A20 platform
in the Gulf of Mexico located approximately twenty-five to thirty
miles southeast of Galveston, Texas."' David Nathan Brown, a
commercial helicopter pilot for Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., was
flying two platform workers from one fixed platform to an-
other.'1 6 The flight originated from High Island 446 platform at
3:04 p.m. and was en route to its destination of High Island 105
platform."' At 3:26 p.m., Mr. Brown reported that the "tail [ro-
tor] gear box chip light [had] illuminated," and he was exper-
iencing a "very high vibration," which "settled down a little bit at
a slower airspeed."" One minute later, Mr. Brown reported
that he was heading towards a platform about 3 miles to his
north."' At 3:31 p.m., he reported that on his first attempt to
land on the High Island A20 platform that he was "not able to
control the tail rotor" and that he would try to land one more
time.12 0  There were no further communications with Mr.
Brown. 121
The helicopter wreckage was located approximately thirty-five
feet from the High Island A20 platform in about fifty feet of
"I See Brown, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 862-64.
112 Id.
113 Eberli, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
114 See id. at 1374.
115 Brown, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
116 Id.
117 Factual Report Aviation, National Transportation Safety Board 1 (Nov. 28,
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water.122 An examination of the platform revealed no evidence
that the helicopter contacted the heliport.1 2 3 However, there
was damage to the roof of the platform control shed, located
one level below the heliport.1 2 1
The families of the decedents filed a wrongful death action
against the manufacturer of the helicopter in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.12 5 Plaintiffs' complaint
asserted product liability causes of action under Texas state
law.1 26 When the district court ruled that the action would be
governed by DOHSA, plaintiffs argued that the Commercial Avi-
ation Exception should apply and that they should be permitted
to recover damages for loss of care, comfort, and companion-
ship.127 Defendants argued that the Commercial Aviation Ex-
ception was inapplicable because Congress did not intend for
the phrase "commercial aviation accident" to apply to aviation
disasters such as Mr. Brown's fatal helicopter crash.128 The dis-
trict court held that the "inescapable conclusion is that Brown's
flight falls within the plain meaning of 'commercial aviation ac-
cident,' and thus the amended DOHSHA provisions are applica-
ble."1 29 The district court relied in part on definitions of
"commercial," "commercial activity," and "aviation" in reaching
its conclusion.3 0 Defendants argued for the district court to in-
122 Id. at la.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Brown v. Eurocopters S.A., 111 F. Supp. 2d 859, 860 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 861.
128 Defendants cited 46 U.S.C. § 30307, which provides that
(1) If the death resulted from a commercial aviation accident oc-
curring on the high seas beyond 12 nautical miles from the shore
of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or de-
pendencies of the United States, additional compensation for non-
pecuniary damages for wrongful death of a decedent is recoverable.
Punitive damages are not recoverable. (2) In this subsection, the
term "nonpecuniary damages" means damages for loss of care,
comfort, and companionship.
46 U.S.C. § 30307(a)-(c) (2006).
129 Brown, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 862.
130 Id. (stating "[t]he legal dictionary definition of 'commercial' is that which
'relates to or is connected with trade and traffic or commerce in general; is occu-
pied with business or commerce.' BLACK's LAW DicrIONARY 270 (9th ed. 2004).
"Commercial activities' are defined as 'any type of business or activity which is
carried on for a profit.' Id. at 38. The term 'aviation' is defined as 'the operation
of heavier-than-air aircraft.' WEBSTER'S ELEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DicrlONARY
119 (2003).").
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terpret "commercial aviation" to mean "regularly scheduled, in-
ternational jumbojet airline service involving tickets and fare
paying customers.""' The district court rejected defendants' in-
terpretation holding that:
Defendants can point to nothing in the language or structure of
[Commercial Aviation Exception] which reveals a Congressional
intent to restrict the meaning of "commercial aviation" to this sort
of flight. Nor can Defendants point to any aspect of the legisla-
tive history which suggests a legislative intent to adopt a more
narrow definition of "commercial aviation." The legislative his-
tory clearly reveals an intention to include within the definition
accidents involving regularly scheduled, international flights
(such as TWA 800), but there is nothing to suggest a desire to
restrict the definition beyond what is already implied by the ad-
jectives "commercial" and "aviation." The Court rejects Defend-
ants' artificially narrow definition.'
The decision in Brown is, to say the least, puzzling. Instead of
thoroughly analyzing the legislative history of the Commercial
Aviation Exception, the district court gave no indication that it
even understood it, much less gave it serious consideration. The
district court supported its decision with the definitions "com-
mercial" and "commercial activity" from Black's Law Dictionary,
and the definition of "aviation" from Webster's Dictionary, and
relied on language contained in several obscure federal aviation
regulations never considered by Congress when enacting the
Commercial Aviation Exception."3 3 The Brown court's failure to
analyze the legislative history of the Commercial Aviation Excep-
tion-which as set forth above, tells a compelling story about the
origins of the amendment-is inexplicable.1 3 4
131 Brown, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 862.
132 Id. at 862-63.
133 The district court referred to various definitions from the Federal Aviation
Regulations ("commercial operator," "air commerce," and "on-demand opera-
tion"), the Department of the Navy's definition of "commercial aviation", and the
Internal Revenue Code's definition of "noncommercial aviation." Id. at 863-64.
134 The Brown decision was authored by Judge Samuel B. Kent, United States
District Judge, Southern District of Texas, and was issued in August 2000. Its
anomalous nature could possibly be traced to personal difficulties that Judge
Kent was experiencing at the time. In an article published in the Wall Street
Journal, Judge Kent acknowledged "that after the death of his first wife in 2000,
he 'had a drinking problem' and sometimes drank during work days. . . ." Peter
Lattman, Embattled Federal Judge Breaks Silence to Houston Chron, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (Jan. 14, 2008, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/01/14/embat-
tled-federaljudge-breaks-silence/; see also H.R. REP. No. 111-159, at 19-20 (2009).
Judge Kent subsequently pled guilty to obstruction of justice and was sentenced
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Since the Brown decision in 2000, Eberli is the only other deci-
sion to address the meaning of the terms "commercial avia-
tion."13 5 Eberli involved the crash of a single-engine, Cirrus SR20
aircraft into the Labrador Sea off the coast of Greenland.1 3 6
Fritz Ernest Schoder, a licensed commercial pilot, was ferrying
the aircraft for delivery to Royal Airport Services Co., Ltd. in
Thailand.1 7 Mr. Schoder's aircraft was accompanied by two
other Cirrus SR20 aircraft as part of a three aircraft ferry mis-
sion.13 8 On February 2, 2007, at 2:05 p.m., the three aircraft de-
parted Goose Bay Airport in Labrador, Canada with a planned
stop in Reykjavik, Iceland.'3  Due to deteriorating weather con-
ditions, the pilots decided to divert to Narsaruaq, Greenland.
Approximately eighty nautical miles from Simiutaq, Greenland,
Mr. Schoder reported to the other two pilots that there was an
indication of fluctuating oil pressure, but the oil temperature
was not increasing, and the engine sounded normal. 140
The three aircraft continued towards Simiutaq.1 4 ' A short
while later, Mr. Schoder reported to the other pilots that the oil
temperature suddenly increased and then returned to nor-
mal. 1 42 At 5:29 p.m., Mr. Schoder advised Sondrestrom FIC that
he might have to declare an emergency due to low oil pres-
sure. 4 3 About twenty minutes later, Mr. Schoder declared an
to 33 months in prison for lying to investigators about sexually abusing two fe-
male employees. Impeach Judge Kent, WASH. POST, June 9, 2009, at A18. Judge
Kent's lawyer, Dick DeGuerin, said in connection with the sentencing that his
client deserved some mercy: "The truth is he's been a walking basket case for
several years. He's not the same man since his first wife died in 2000." Id. Be-
cause Judge Kent did not immediately resign upon his conviction, the House of
Representatives voted unanimously to impeach him. Subsequently, Judge Kent
submitted his resignation and is now serving his sentence. See generally James C.
McKinley, Judge Sentenced to Prison for Lying About Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
2009, at Al5; Chris Paschenko, Congress Wrapping Up Business on Kent, GALVESTON
COUNTY DAILY NEWS, July 22, 2009, http://galvestondailynews.com/story.lasso?
ewkd=37381edd02c65112.
135 See Eberli v. Cirrus Design Corp., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1372-73 (S.D. Tex.
2000).
136 See id. at 1372-73.
137 Id.
18 Final Report, Accident Investigation Board Denmark, HCLJ510-000330 Ac-
cident 1 (Feb. 2, 2000), available at http://www.hd.dk/graphics/Synkron-
Library/hd/dokumonter/Redegorelsar/2007/510-000330.pdf.
139 Id.
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emergency and reported his position as approximately fifty nau-
tical miles from Simiutaq.'" At 6:00 p.m., Mr. Schoder reported
that he was getting ready to ditch and was putting on his survival
suit. He successfully ditched the aircraft at approximately 6:11
p.m.; however, due to the lack of an adequate survival suit pro-
viding insulation and flotation, Mr. Schoder perished in the
frigid waters of the Labrador Sea.1 5 A rescue helicopter dis-
patched from Niaqornaq, Greenland, located the ditched air-
craft. Mr. Schoder's body was found floating near the open
cabin door."' By the time Mr. Schoder's body was recovered
several hours later, the aircraft had sunk and was never
recovered.14 7
Mr. Schoder's widow filed a wrongful death action against the
aircraft manufacturer, Cirrus Design Corporation, and the air-
craft engine manufacturer, Teledyne Continental Motors, in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging
product liability causes of action under Florida state law.'4  The
district court held, however, that plaintiff's action was governed
by DOHSA.149 As a result, plaintiff argued that because Mr.
Schoder was ferrying an aircraft as part of a commercial activity
carried out for profit and related to commerce, the accident
qualified as "commercial aviation accident" under DOHSA's
Commercial Aviation Exception.5 0 Defendants argued that the
Commercial Aviation Exception had no application to an acci-
dent involving the ferrying of a general aviation aircraft.' 5 '
The district court began its analysis by noting that the phrase
"commercial aviation accident" was ambiguous because it gave
rise to at least two different interpretations. 1 5 2 The phrase could
either be (1) an accident that occurs during the course of avia-
tion involving commerce (as plaintiff argued relying on the
144 Id.
145 Id. at 3.
146 Id. at 10.
147 Id. at 1.
148 See Eberli v. Cirrus Design Corp., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1369 (S.D. Tex.
2000).
149 See id.
150 Id. at 1372 (stating "[s]ection 30307(b) states: In an action under this chap-
ter, if the death resulted from a commercial aviation accident occurring on the
high seas beyond 12 nautical miles from the shore of the United States, addi-
tional compensation is recoverable for nonpecuniary damages, but punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable." 46 U.S.C. § 30307(b) (2006)).
151 See id. at 1372.
152 Id. at 1372-73.
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Brown decision) or (2) an accident that occurs during the trans-
portation of passengers or cargo for commercial purposes (as
defendants argued). 5 3 Based on the Operating Limitations of
the Certificate of Airworthiness for the aircraft 15 and the legisla-
tive history of the amendment to DOHSA, the district court held
that Mr. Schoder's death during the ferrying of the subject air-
craft fell outside the scope of "commercial aviation accident"
and therefore the Commercial Aviation Exception was
inapplicable.15 1
Unlike the district court in Brown, the Eberli court specifically
considered the legislative history of the Commercial Aviation
Exception:
Finally, a review of the legislative history of the statute supports
the Court's interpretation of the statute. There appears to be
general agreement that the [Commercial Aviation Exception]
was enacted in the aftermath of a number of international air
disasters and the lawsuits arising out of such air disasters, in
which the families of the victims were denied loss of society dam-
ages under DOHSA. Recognizing the unfairness of allowing or
denying the families of airline passengers nonpecuniary damages
solely on the basis of where the crash occurred, Congress acted
to "ensure that all families would be treated the same regardless
of where a plane happened to crash."'5
Relying on language in the House Reports, plaintiff at-
tempted to argue that the impetus behind the enactment of the
Commercial Aviation Exception was to establish similar treat-
153 Id. at 1373.
154 The district court noted that the section of the transportation code that
delineates when an aircraft is engaged in commercial or public flight operations
defines "commercial purposes" as "the transportation of person or property for
compensation or hire." Id. at 1373 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40125). The subject air-
craft Certificate of Airworthiness specified that "no person may operate this air-
craft for carrying passengers or property for compensation or hire." See id.
Likewise, the court rejected plaintiffs argument that Mr. Schoder was a "com-
mercial operator" as defined under the FAR because "Mr. Schoder was carrying
property-the aircraft itself-for compensation as part of his ferrying business,
and that he, therefore, was a commercial operator engaged in commercial avia-
tion." Id. The court stated that it "does not see how the subject aircraft could
qualify as 'property' for purpose of the FAR, considering that the Operating Lim-
itations, which were written with Mr. Schoder's ferrying operation in mind, spe-
cifically state that the aircraft cannot be operated to carry property." Id.
155 See id.
156 Id. at 1373-74 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-201, at 2).
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ment of the families of all air crash victims.1 5 7 The district court
dismissed this argument, stating that
[p]laintiff seizes upon the language in the House Reports that
laments how families of air crash victims were treated differently
prior to the enactment of section 30307 based on the location of
the crash. However, were it true that this concern-that the fam-
ilies of all air crash victims should be treated the same-was the
driving force behind section 30307, the statute would have made
nonpecuniary damages recoverable under DOHSA for all avia-
tion-related accidents. The fact that Congress limited the scope
of section 30307 to "commercial aviation accidents" leads this
Court to believe that Congress wanted the statute to apply only in
cases involving the types of aviation disasters, such as the crash of
TWA flight 800, that motivated Congress to enact section
30307."' 5
The Eberli court concluded that in enacting the Commercial
Aviation Exception, Congress had no intention that the statute
should be applied to accidents involving the ferrying of general
aviation aircraft. 1 5 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The Commercial Aviation Exception was enacted by Congress
in response to a series of commercial airline accidents, and it
allows recovery of loss of society damages in actions arising from
a "commercial aviation accident." The legislative history of this
amendment to DOHSA makes it clear that the only reasonable
construction of the Commercial Aviation Exception is that the
provision applies solely to actions arising from commercial air-
line accidents on the high seas and has no application whatso-
ever in wrongful death actions arising from general aviation
accidents on the high seas. The decision in Eberli v. Cirrus Design
Corp. correctly concluded that the Commercial Aviation Excep-
tion should only apply to commercial aviation disasters, such as
the crash of TWA flight 800, which motivated Congress to enact
the Commercial Aviation Exception.
157 Id. at 1374.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1369.
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